Cooperation with Evil: Formal vs. Material

For those people who think that the new so-called “compromise” that Obama has magnanimously offered on Catholic institutions providing birth control, the following materal should be useful. The pro-compromisers seem to thaink that if the Chuch isn’t paying for the birth control, then everything is fine. But even assuming arguendo that insurers wouldn’t pass on the cost of the birth control to the Church, the problem remains if the birth control coverage remains, regardless of who is paying for it. To understand why, peruse the following two authorities: First, paragraph 1868 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them:

- by participating directly and voluntarily in them;

- by ordering, advising, praising, or approving them;

- by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so;

- by protecting evil-doers.

Next, a discussion on formal and material cooperation with evil authored by the  Pontifical Academy for Life in its 2005 document “Moral Reflections OnVaccines Prepared From Cells Derived From Aborted Human Foetuses”:

The first fundamental distinction to be made is that between formal and material cooperation. Formal cooperation is carried out when the moral agent cooperates with the immoral action of another person, sharing in the latter's evil intention. On the other hand, when a moral agent cooperates with the immoral action of another person, without sharing his/her evil intention, it is a case of material cooperation.

Material cooperation can be further divided into categories of immediate (direct) and mediate (indirect), depending on whether the cooperation is in the execution of the sinful action per se, or whether the agent acts by fulfilling the conditions - either by providing instruments or products - which make it possible to commit the immoral act. Furthermore, forms of proximate cooperation and remote cooperation can be distinguished, in relation to the "distance" (be it in terms of temporal space or material connection) between the act of cooperation and the sinful act committed by someone else. Immediate material cooperation is always proximate, while mediate material cooperation can be either proximate or remote.

Formal cooperation is always morally illicit because it represents a form of direct and intentional participation in the sinful action of another person.¹⁰ Material cooperation can sometimes be illicit (depending on the conditions of the "double effect" or "indirect voluntary" action), but when immediate material cooperation concerns grave attacks on human life, it is always to be considered illicit, given the precious nature of the value in question¹¹.

A further distinction made in classical morality is that between active (or positive) cooperation in evil and passive (or negative) cooperation in evil, the former referring to the performance of an act of cooperation in a sinful action that is carried out by another person, while the latter refers to the omission of an act of denunciation or impediment of a sinful action carried out by another person, insomuch as there was a moral duty to do that which was omitted¹².

Passive cooperation can also be formal or material, immediate or mediate, proximate or remote. Obviously, every type of formal passive cooperation is to be considered illicit, but even passive material cooperation should generally be avoided, although it is admitted (by many authors) that there is not a rigorous obligation to avoid it in a case in which it would be greatly difficult to do so.

So if the Church is buying a group policy that covers contraceptives and abortifacients, whether or not the Church pays for those items, it is formally cooperating with evil, in that it intends to purchase and make available a policy that covers the items in question.

Further explanation and discussion can be found in a document published by the National Catholic Bioethics Center:

The impressive realism and coherence of Christian morality is based in part upon the fundamental convictions that (1) there is an objective moral order which can be known by the intellect and that (2) some actions are ''intinsically evil,'' that is, they are never morally justifiable regardless of the circumstances of the act. This is one of the major teachings of Veritatis Splendor. Three theological principles have been developed to deal with the ethical permissibility of actions which relate to either physical evil or the moral evil of other agents. These are known as (1) the principle of the double effect (see Ethics & Medics 3/95), (2) the choice of the ''lesser evil,'' and (3) the principles of cooperation. These concepts have been taught and reflected upon, and, with the exception of the second (lesser evil), they have enjoyed generally unquestioned acceptance in philosophical ethics and Catholic moral theology.

Historical Origins

St. Alphonsus Liguori (d. 1787) made the principles of cooperation acceptable by introducing the distinction between formal and material cooperation and by a consideration of scandal as a serious invitation to sin. Cooperation in the ethically significant sense is defined as the participation of one agent in the activity of another agent to produce a particular effect or share in a joint activity. This becomes ethically problematical when the action of the primary agent is morally wrong.

There are three basic examples of cooperation on the part of individuals: the hostage, the taxpayer and the accomplice. The participation or cooperation of these individuals in the morally questionable acts of the principal agent is quite distinct one from another. The hostage is forced with threats to comply with the evil act of another person. Fear more or less compels the hostage to cooperate. This diminishes his culpability and in some cases eliminates it completely. In contrast, the accomplice may perform the same act as the hostage, but culpability is imputed fully because cooperation in this instance is free and willed (directly intended). The taxpayer is an example of one who cooperates with a principal agent (the government) in an important - in fact, essential - mission (societal governance). Nevertheless, it is possible that the government may sponsor activities which are immoral. The taxpayer then contributes in some degree to this immoral activity. However, contributing to the stability of society is not an intrinsic evil but a good.

The Principal Distinctions

Among the principles of cooperation, the primary distinction is between formal and material cooperation. Formal cooperation is a willing participation on the part of the cooperative agent in the sinful act of the principal agent. This formal cooperation can either be explicit (''Yes, I'm happy to drive the getaway car because I want to be an accomplice'') or implicit.

''Implicit formal cooperation is attributed when, even though the cooperator denies intending the wrongdoer's object, no other explanation can distinguish the cooperator's object from the wrongdoer's object'' (Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Services, [1994] Appendix). the motto of the implicit formal cooperator is ''I am personally opposed, but...'' This cooperation is as immoral as explicit formal cooperation.Material cooperation has several inherent distinctions, the most basic being that of immediate and mediate material cooperation. Theologians maintain that in the objective order, immediate material cooperation is equivalent to implicit formal cooperation because the object of the moral act of the cooperator is indistinguishable from that of the principal agent. Those who use the term ''immediate material cooperation'' have understood this as ethically unacceptable behavior. An example of this would be any form of employment in an abortion clinic.

Immediate material cooperation is contrasted with mediate cooperation. Here the moral object of the cooperator's act is not that of the wrongdoer's. (An example of this would be a health care worker employed in a secular hospital that also provides for morally prohibited procedures, but does not require the conscientious objector to such procedures to participate.) This kind of cooperation can be justified (1) for a sufficient reason and (2) if scandal can be avoided. It is a form of cooperating with the circumstances surrounding the wrongdoer's act. Depending on how closely these circumstances impinge upon the act, there is a distinction between proximate and remote material cooperation. (Proximate material cooperation would be the recovery room nurse who cares for all post-surgical patients, including those who may have undergone morally illicit procedures. This form of routine care is not intrinsically evil.)

Further, necessary material cooperation is that without which the sinful act could not occur. Contingent cooperation (also called free cooperation) is that without which the evil act would still take place. An example of necessary material cooperation would be being the only anesthesiologist available to assist with a woman undergoing a combination C-section and tubal ligation. Contingent material cooperation would exist if one were not the only such professional available.

Bottom line: The Church can’t partner with the government or the insurance company in providing these products to employees, regardless of who is paying for them. What part of this are the compromisers unable to understand?