Monday, June 4, 2012
The Battle of Midway: 70 Years Ago Today
Today is the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Midway and Admiral (then Rear Admiral) Raymond A.
Spruance's celebrated victory and finest hour. Relatively junior and
untested in carrier warfare, he went up against the Japanese varsity, in
the persons of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and Vice Admiral Chūichi
Nagumo, and (figuratively) handed them their heads. One of the most important moments in American military and naval history.
Let's remember Spruance, a largely unsung hero, along with all those who fought and died at Midway, especially the brave pilots of VT-6 and VT-8.
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36 comments:
I would add Normandy. But, why New Orleans? Guadalcanal would also have to rate high because it was the first time in the Pacific that a major US force met a major Japanese force in a land battle. Also, the five major sea encounters with the Japanese navy off Guadalcanal, although our losses were heavy, showed that the US Navy could at least hold its own with the powerful and professional Japanese navy.
I won't deny the importance of the battles you mention, but I'd argue that the ones on my list are different. With the exception of Gettysburg, which is there partly because of its relationship to Vicksburg, all of the ones on my list caused a decisive shift in the geostrategic balance of power. Saratoga gave us the leverage to bring in the French, without which we wouldn't have won (and without which there may have been no French revolution). Jackson's victory at New Orleans eliminated the danger of a European Power bottling up the US commercially and hindering or even preventing US expansion; it was the final blow that guaranteed that U.S. independence would be permanent. Vicksburg was New orleans in reverse, (as Antietam was Saratoga in reverse); where Antietam meant that England would not aid the CSA, Vicksburg meant the strangulation of the CSA in terms of materiel. Simultaneously, Gettysburg destroyed the offensive power that was already in the CSA.
Midway is on the list because had we lost there, we either would have had to accede to Japan's or the USSR's control of East Asia, thus possibly giving the Cold War a very different outcome. Or, if we'd stayed fixated on Japan, we'd have had far fewer resources to put into Europe. The USSR would thus have taken all of Germany, and maybe more, with huge ramifications for the Cold War.
Were I to add a couple more to the list I would add the WWI and WWII Battles of the Atlantic, particularly the latter. Had we lost that one, Hitler would have beaten the USSR.
No disagreement with any of that, but clear me up on NO. The treaty had already been signed, so I guess the issue of the possession of NO was still in doubt? I forget my history on that war...
On another note, I have often argued with my War Between the States buff friends that Vicksburg was possibly the most significant battle of the war because it split the Confederacy and gave the Union complete control of the Mississippi. That and Gettysburg were the final one/two blow. Had Lee only known what he was facing at Gettysburg he may have been able to salvage a victory and McClellan might have become President. THAT would have been significant.
I just finished reading, for the second time, James Hornfischer's book, "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors." It is a narrative history of the sea battle that took place off Samar in the Phillipine Sea during the Leyte Gulf campaign and the US Navy support of MacArthur's invasion of the Phillipines. A squadron of destroyers and destroyer escorts took on Kurita's major battle fleet, which included two battleships, four heavy cruisers, and numerous destroyers, because Halsey had taken Ozawa's bait and sailed north to chase the diversionary Japanese carriers. The DD's were all that was left guarding the San Bernadino Strait through which sailed this huge Japanese battle group. This is naval warfare history at its very best and an unbelievable account of heroism and audacity. Read it!
I'll agree with Midway, New Orleans and Saratoga for the reasons you state (strategic shift in power) but I disagree with both Vicksburg and Gettysburg. By 1863 the war was lost strategically and was simply going through the motions. I'd put Antietam on the list because it does alter the Balance of Power (the Emancipation of the Slaves following this Union "victory" made it impossible for Europe to recognize the Confederacy, and without that recognition there was no hope of winning a long war). The 5th batle I would put on the list is Yorktown. French assistance did not make US Independence inevitable, such was the power of England's Navy in the 18th Century. French assistance afforded the opportunity for Yorktown, but it was Yorktown itself that stood the world on it's head and shifted the power balance.
My Top 5 US Battles in order:
Saratoga
Yorktown
New Orleans
Antietam
Midway
Gene: I haven't read the Tin Can Sailors, but I know the battle well. Herman Wouk, speaking as Pug Henry, said thet every American school child should learn about that battle, and our enemies should ponder it.
Templar: Good points about Antietam, and several big-name historians agree with you (as do I to a large extent, though I think the word "impossible" is a bit strong). Yorktown I hadn't considered, but you make an excellent argument (and I like your "World Turned Upside Down" reference).
But I'll stick to my guns on Vicksburg. The war was _not_ lost strategically until Vicksburg fell, or was at least besieged. As long as one of the two east-west trunk lines remained opened, allowing materiel to flow in through Mexico and the Trans-Mississippi, the South still had a chance. Vicksburg severed the last of the two lines. In that regard it's far more important than Gettysburg, which makes my list only because of its coincident timing with Vicksburg. I.e., at Gettysburg Lee squandered his remaining offensive power, and Vicksburg ensured that he couldn't replace it. (Of course he could never have replaced the men at any rate.) If you're interested, J.F. C. Fuller has an interesting geostrategic analysis of the comparative importance of the eastern and western theaters in vol. 3 of his military history of the western world. He agrees with me (or rather, I with him) that the west, and not the east, was key. And the south didn't lose the west until Grant went after Vicksburg. And it wasn't a forgone conclusion that Grant would get it; he failed in his first attempts, after all.
After summer 1863 the South couldn't win militarily. It could only hope to drag things out long enough that the North would tire of fighting. _That_ remained a definite possibility (though not a very great one) until Davis sacked Johnston in 1864 and replaced him with Hood. Hood's loss of Atlanta was the final nail in the coffin, ensuring Lincoln's re-election. From October 64 to June 65, I'll definitely agree that the South was just going through the motions.
I'm a fan of Fuller, although I have not read that title of his. It doesn't stop me from agreeing that the Western Theater was more important than the Eastern Theater.
However, "Raw minerals that the South was bereft of were acquired through trade with Mexico, most notably sulphur, copper, powder, and niter. Union officials recognized the extent of trade with Mexico, and aggressively tried to interrupt it. Despite their efforts, and the fall of the Mississippi into Union hands, flow of goods from Mexico to the Confederacy was unabated until the end of the war." (William Diamond Imports of the Confederate Government from Europe and Mexico The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 6, No. 4)
The Confederacy had only 1 chance of Victory, quick military success that led to European recognition. Without they were doomed. The Union going through it's motions of the Anaconda Plan step by step is merely interesting as an operational study, just as the AofNVA victories are interesting Tactical study, none of it changes the strategic balance of power. Once Lincoln made the war explictly about Slavery (vice "rights") Europe could NOT recognize the Slave holding south. They had abondoned Slavery 2 generations previous, even the loans made by European Banking houses brought howls of protest. In terms of the Strategic outcome of teh Civil War Antietam, or more precisely the political action it affored Lincoln, is the only battle of note in the entire war. Everything else was inevitable.
Last Stand is an excellent book Gene. If I might recommend another, almost a book end to that, read Six Frigates by Ian Toll. It's about the estasblishment of the US Navy, and it's traditions fighting the Barbary Pirates, then in war of 1812. The traditions and bravery established then were much in evidence in 44 in the ships and sailors of taffy 3.
Templar, I have read Six Frigates and it sits on my shelf calling me again...
Have you read O'Brian's Aubrey/Maturin series about the Napoleanic Wars? If you have not, just go do it...no questions. The first book is "Master and Commander." Read them in order...all 20. Patrick O'Brian sea novels should pull the reference online.
Templar,
I'm afraid that the article you quote says something very different to me than it does to you. The section of the article on which you rely, which deals with the Mexican trade, beginning around page 498, explicitly regards shipments of goods to the Trans-Mississippi, not the cis-Mississippi where the decisive fighting took place and which my Vicksburg argument concerns. Yes, the flow of goods from Mexico continued, but only into the Trans-Mississippi, where, frankly, it did no good to the important theaters. Further, on page 493, Diamond expressly notes (supporting my argument) that "The Trans-Mississippi Department, earlier an important source of beef and hogs, became inaccessible [largely because of Vicksburg's fall] before the end of 1863."
As for the rest, you're certainly entitled to your opinion, but I don't share it, I believe it's untenable, and I think that few historians would side with you. "Could NOT recognize" is very strong language. England could do whatever it wanted, although I'll agree that for the reasons you state the Proclamation made recognition highly unlikely. But that's irrelevant in the sense that while English recognition would have been highly desirable and gone far towards establishing Confederate victory, it wasn't strictly necessary for Confederate victory. Once again, there was a reasonable chance that, absent the fall of Atlanta prior to the election of 1864, McClellan and the Peace Democrats may have won the White House in the wake of Grant's bloody Overland campaign earlier in the year and then proceeded to negotiate a peace.
And if you want to focus on the English reaction, I think it's significant that the bottom dropped out of Confederate bonds on the European markets not after Antietam, not after the Emancipation Proclamation, but after Vicksburg/Gettysburg.
Frankly, I'm not aware of any historian who states that a Confederate loss was inevitable after Antietam. There may be some, but they're doubtless a distinct minority. McPherson gives the best argument I know of in favor of Antietam as the turning point, and I don't think he speaks of it in terms of inevitability, though I may be wrong.
I think that inevitability is a very tricky concept in history; a much more useful approach is a sliding scale of increasing or declining odds. At any rate, I simply disagree; while I do agree that the odds against the CSA went up because of Antietam, try as I might, I think the spike in July 1863 was higher, and I can't see the odds rising to the level of inevitability you're talking about until November of 1864. But as I say, you're entitled to your opinion.
Well, I have read quite a bit about the War Between the States and it seems that many do see the one-two punch of Gettysburg and Vicksburg as the death dealing blows. I don't really have a strong opinion, but such huge Union victories coming so close together was, indeed, pretty devastating. I suppose there were a number of turning points, the first being us starting a war without having a single cannon factory! LOL!
I personally think the death of Stonewall Jackson was equivalent to the loss of several major battles. Of course, installing Hood was just tossing an anchor to a sinking rowboat...
LOL, I shall concede we are both entitled to our opinions.
I prefer to look at things in reverse. If the Confederacy wins at both Vicksburg and Gettysburg, what changes? Vicksburg I think falls eventually, maybe in 1864, or maybe in the winter of 63. The western theater by 63 couldn't muster the strength to defend against the Union and a breaking of the siege in 63 only postpones its fate. Gettysburg is a little different, not being a siege, but even with a victory I don't see Lee having the strength to stay in the North, nor even the logistics to stay there if unmolested by the Union, as they surely would have been. Certainly he lacked the strength to march on DC by 63 and breach the fortifications there. So what does a CSA victory at gettysburg buy them? Recognition? I don't think so. Not without a follow up and there was no real hope of that win or lose. The only viable option for Confederate victory is if National Morale in the north cracks after the defeats, and I don't see it getting out of hand enough. Lincoln was a pretty ruthless President, I have no hesitation to say he would have held the Union together through full martial law if needs be.
That leaves only an 1864 Democratic election victory as a hope for the Confederacy? Perhaps I have not studied that enough but I don't see it as much of a hope, even if the armies are fighting no where near Atlanta in 64.
I spent my whole life studying military affairs, the ACW in particular. Oddly enough I spent the first 25 years of life as a Yankee who used to dream of Confederate "What If's" and the second 25 years living as a Southern (Damn Yankee to those native born) whose continued study reveals no hope for the South beyond a quick string of victories leading to foreign recognition, and after 1862 I see no likely possibility of that happening. Antietiam would have capped a long string of victories, the last on Union territory and would have allowed the only possibility for recognition.
I have enjoyed the discussion.
Gene, I have "listened" to the O'Brian books. My job takes me on regular trips to Florida and I prefer to drive in lieu of sitting in airports, and I usually listen to one of those books on the way there and back. I do love them, but the library lacks the whole series. I may have to shift to the Hornblower series for my listening pleasure soon :)
Templar,
I think you sell the morale issue short. I agree that What Lee was doing was carrying out a raid rather than an invasion, and that even if he'd won at Gettysburg (or even avoided fighting there altogether) he couldn't have taken Washington But he didn't need to.
So here's what I imagine happening. Lee wins a clear-cut victory at Gettysburg. Meanwhile Grant fails to get across the Mississippi, and his inability to take Vicksburg results in Lincoln sacking him, which several historians believe would have happened. I don't know whether recognition would have happened at that point (probably it wouldn't have) and I don't care. I think at that point the peace movement in the north gets a huge impetus, especially as the draft riots in NYC are following hard on the heels of Gettysburg.
Yes, Lincoln was ruthless, but he always gave very good constitutional justifications for his actions and he never put himself in a position where he was officially contravened by Congress. He never gave any hint that if McClellan beat him in 64 he would disregard the election and hold on to power. If he had faced a major peace movement arising in sumer 63, then, I argue that it would have been uncharacteristic of him to declare national martial law. In that case the Union war effort would have wound down, especially if Grant wasn't around at Chattanooga and the Overland Campaign, and McClellan's victory would have ended it.
If Lincoln _had_ bucked a groundswell peace movement in summer 63, though, I can easily imagine Kentucky and Maryland seceding, and McClellan publicly opposing Lincoln and thus sowing large-scale dissent within the army, with whom Little Mac remained very popular. In other words, it is not at all unlikely that what was left of the Union would have torn itself apart over the peace issue and so been incapable of imposing its will on the South.
Speculative? Yes. But it's sufficient, in my book, to overcome the "inevitability" bar you've set.
As to credentials, I'll see your lifetime of studying military affairs and raise you the fact that I AM TEACHING CIVIL WAR RIGHT NOW AT MACON STATE! I AM EVEN MORE ACADEMIC AND BRILLIANT THAT STEVEN MILLIES! I AM GODLIKE!! (hehehe)
Yes, but are you a "political theorist?" LOL!
I am happy to have this Civil War ( I hate that term, but it is an easier shorthamd)discussion. I have done extensive reading in the war, but have never gotten into the what-if's you are discussing. My strongest area is WWII, which I have taught seminars on for the local private HS students and about which I am finishing a novel.
Was there ever a feasible opportunity, early in the war when McClellan was idling around, for Lee to make a huge and sudden strike against Washington? That would have been major...if there was such an opportunity, why did he not do so?
No . . . no, I am not a political theorist. . . . I guess Templar wins after all. I'm sorry, Templar. ;-)
I don't think Lee was ever particularly interested in Washington, though I will certainly defer to Templar on that point. Probably by 1862 the Washington defenses were too strong. There was Early's raid in 64, of course, but even if Early had been bolder I'm not sure how much he could have done. As for Gettysburg, Lee would have been better off going for a softer target like Harrisburg, Philadephia, etc., but that's me talking, not Lee. The best shot the CSA had at DC was after First Manassas, and there's a running debate over who was pushing a follow-up and who dragged his heels. Jackson, I seem to recall, wanted to pursue; I've heard conflicting things about Davis.
I have reade that Davis feared that an attack on DC would only strengthen Union resolve...as if it weren't already. It does seem to me that, right after Manassas, it would have been a tremendous psychological victory, especially if Lee could have occupied and held the Capitol. Shelli9ng DC would have been major...wouldn't you like to do it now...LOL! It would have been hard to hold, though. There were other opportunities for a much more ruthless follow-up...Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg leap to mind. Chancellorsville could have been the complete victory with the opportunity to destroy a major army.
LOL, no need to state your credentials, I know them well enough, and your wife's I might add. In addition to any academic and brilliance advantages you hold over Dr Millies, you also are considerably less pompus and annoying than he. LOL
I agree Lee never had any interest in Washington, and in my opinion McClellan was never idling around Gene. His Penninsula campaign in '62 should have worked and I believe would have had it been fought with Union troops and leaders of 1863 caliber. McClellan's only fault was that he gave council to his fears. Matched against the audacity of Lee it was a dreadful combination. In the West McClellan would have done as well as Grant I dare say.
Early's raid in 64 had no chance, he had less than 10k men, and Grant rightfully ignored him.
Lee's target in 63 was Harrisburg, as you know Gettysburg was not a planned battle. Neither side had scouted it as a potential place of battle, and it evolved as a classic meeting engagement. Newt Gingrich has a really great alternative history book on Gettysburg that preposes a Confederate Victory in the campaign because Lee is able to offer battle on a field of his choosing, adequately scouted, and tactically defensive in nature, despite beiing operational on the offensive. It's a good read.
I don't think southern planning ever had any serious advance on DC in mind, as from the beginning they viewed their war as Defensive in nature. If the Union had let them go they would have done so peacefully. (and probably ended slavery in their own due time a generation or so later).
Templar, thanks for your warm words about me being less pompous than Millies, but you really aren't saying much. Isn't everybody? :-)
Otherwise I agree with everything in your post except for your statement about how well McClellan would have done in the West. He just doesn't strike me as having the initiative that Grant showed at Henry/Donelson, Vicksburg, etc. Maybe he would have been as good as Sherman during the Atlanta campaign. Maybe. But he would not have proceeded with Sherman's ruthlessness afterwards since he was all about convincing Southerners to come back through a relatively restrained use of force. In short, as a Georgian I would have vastly preferred Little Mac to Sherman in GA.
Re your comment about the the demise of slavery, I just tonight told Gene he should read _The Guns of the South._ Alternative history with a science fiction element. I believe that McPherson has even used it to teach. It posits some very interesting ideas re the politics of slavery in a victorious CSA.
Grant was a Patton and MacClellan a Montgomery. I think MacClellan was intimidated by Lee and easily put off by some of Lee's tricks...like running the same train in and out of the station to loud cheering and hooplah to make Mac think Lee had far more troops than he did. He would have been no match for Lee or Jackson, or even Early on any field. Yes, I certainly would have preferred him in Ga. rather than Sherman.
Grant gets a lot of bad press. He was a fine General with a grim will and a patient ruthlessness. Had he been in the East from the beginning, Lee would have had a much more difficult opponent.
Buck, Thanks for the talk about NO yesterday. I did not realize the significance of the likelihood that the Brits would have kept NO in the Treaty without that Battle.
Gene: In the West, Grant showed himself (particularly at Vicksburg) as a world-class tactician, the equal (or better) of any previous American general and of most who came after. He'd obviously studied how Scott had done things in Mexico and successfully applied, and adapted, those lessons to the Western theater. McClellan had obviously studied them too, but he didn't get them the way Grant did.
But when Grant moved east to the narrow confines of Virginia, hemmed in by mountains and ocean and dealing with rivers that worked not with but against him, he adopted a very different style of fighting, and in my view showed himself to be Lee's inferior as a tactician. (That's a complex question, though, since Lee's strength lay in the tactical defensive and Grant's was the tactical offensive.) It's often overlooked (at least by non-Civil War people), that Grant never once beat Lee in a tactical engagement, but then he didn't need to. He simply bled (and in the end starved) Lee to death. It took a while and it was inelegant and horribly bloody (especially compared to the Grant of the West), which is what gets Grant his bad press (even among northerners, who in summer 1864 were referring to Grant as "the butcher"). But it worked, and in so doing it also changed the fundamental principles of American military doctrine.
The meeting at Appomattox was a change of command between Washingtonian attrition strategy, of which Lee was the greatest practitioner, and Grant/Sherman annihilation, which heavily shaped how we have fought ever since, particularly in WWI and WWII. It was also the passing of the torch from southern agrarian political rule in America to northern commercial/industrial political rule. Appomattox was so much more than a military surrender that one cannot comprehend American history unless he understands all that it means.
Very nicely stated, Buck. Lee was, indeed, a defensive tactical genius. One wonders, however, had Lee accepted the offer to lead Union forces...with all the resources and manpower behind him and, thus, the ability to ply his skills as an offensive tactician...whether he would not have made very short work of the Confederacy.
Oh wow, world class tactician? I can't buy that. What evidence? He was great at Strategy perhaps, but on a battlefield he only won where he was expected to, and lost a few of those. His great victories are what? Vicksburg, top of the list? It was a successful siege (as all would be when outside relief is impossible) and before it was a Siege Grant got his ass handed to him at Champions Hill. First attempt to take Vicksburg? Complete failure. Shiloh? He was lucky to have survived at all, was blamed for the debacle and temporaily removed from Command of the Army of Tennesse in recognition of the fact. Henry and Donelson? He wasn't truly in command, Admiral Foote was, and he was only a Brigadier, very small battles, won or lost hardly the stuff of Napoleonic dreams.
Grant understood very clearly what it would take to win the war, and applied it very well, even in the East, but he was no tactical genius. He was a bit of a Butcher, but I don't consider that a bad thing, it's just not elegance that one would associate with genius. He may have been as daring as Patton, but Patton won battles, Grant only won a war, and did so without winning any battles East or West, or any significant size.
Now, when you look at all that, I stand by my statement that Little Mac would have done just as well in the West as Grant. Would he have fought like Grant? No, but the strategic results would have been the same. A.S Johnston's death at Shiloh eliminated the one man of talent and sufficient rank to have contended in the west against either a Grant or a McClellan (or Thomas or Sherman). The collection of n'er do wells that succeeded Johnston were all second rates.
Yep. World-class tactician.
Vicksburg and what else, you ask? What more do you need? Very few commanders in history show themselves a master in every campaign they fight. Napoleon, until Russia (that's a big "until"). Nelson, practically every time. Lee, most of the time he was on defense. But for a lot of other generals, it's just a campaign or two. (Very few commanders, in fact, get to fight as many pitched battles as you see the commanders in our Civil War fight, and when they do their weaknesses are revealed, but that doesn't negate their strengths.) For instance, Spruance at Midway and MacArthur at Inchon. I rank Spruance as one of the best tacticians the US Navy has ever produced, and I do it on the basis of Midway alone. I happen to approve of how he handled Philippine Sea, but he showed no tactical brilliance there, just as Grant showed none against Lee.
At Vicksburg, Grant maneuvered a large army through very difficult terrain in hostile territory without supply lines and caught his enemy with his pants down. (Sure, Grant lost at Champion Hill; I'm sure that was a huge consolation to Pemberton as he was surrendering Vicksburg. Same for the first day at Shiloh. Pity for the CSA that there was a second day. Reminds me of the one about the two Soviet generals who meet on the street in Soviet-occupied Paris after WWIII. "So,tell me, Sergei," says one to the other, "who won the air war--us or them?")
Other than Jackson in the Valley and at Chancellorsville, nothing immediately occurs to me in this war to match Grant at Vicksburg. In doing so he saved the Union, if you buy my thesis (which I know you don't) that Vicksburg was the key battle.
Templar and Gene: changing the subject, how about Millies's (non)reply to my contractual offer? Priceless, no?
RE: Millie...no surprise here. He will probably ask you to define "Magisterium" and "deny."
Obviously, Anon2 is not Findlay, but must be a law prof. His solicitous slobbering over Millie is disgusting. It is like they are French kissing in the living room in front of everybody. Sheesh!
On another note: My list of America's top 5 Generals (not necesarily in order):
1.Washington
2.Lee
3.Grant
4.Patton
5.Ike...he was no field General, but his achievments during North Africa and Overlord must put him on the list...unless you want to make a separate category.
Not only was his non-reply priceless, Fr MacDonald just hung him on his own rope.
On Grant as tactical genius...I don't buy the premise because the Victory at Vicksburg was purely strategic, operational level at best, but as tactics it was a siege and arguably therefore devoid of actual tactics. The tactical part of the battle was a failure which necessitated the siege. As for Shiloh, yes bad luck for PGTB there was a day 2, good luck for Grant there was a Buell to bail him out from his mess created by poor operational and tactical deployments on Day 1.
I'm not saying Grant wasn't A GENIUS, I'm sayiing he's not a TACTICAL GENIUS. His genius was at a higher level of operations than a battlefield.
As for a list of Top 5 Generals, I wil have to think about it before chiming in. I would first try and bound it....you have lsited all Army Commanders so I would say argue from the Army/Fleet level of command. Bedford Forrest was a genius (a real tactical genius lol) but I don't think you can put him in the same discussion as Washingtons and Grants, it's apples and oranges.
My Top 5 US Generals (I ignored Admirals, I think they need a list fo their own).
1) Washington
2) Lee
3) Scott
4) Eisenhower
5) Grant
I rate them in that order and all for their Strategic and Operational abilities, although some of them were Tactically gifted as well. I did not include some very great Generals (like Jackson) becasue they did not hold Army command (actual Army command not just a name).
RE: Leyte. I do not have the book in front of me, but there is a great line in "Tin Can Sailors" (Hornfischer). When Captain Evans of the Destroyer Johnston, I believe it was, realized that the DD's and DE's were the only line between Kurita's huge fleet and MacArthur's transports, he "turned to his XO and gave an order never before heard on a destroyer in the history of naval warfare...'attack that battleship.' LOL! Unfortunately, Evans and over 200 of his crew were killed in the encounter when the Johnston was sunk by 18 and 14 inch shells from the Yamato and the Chokai...but not before their torpedoes and incredibly persistent fire from 5" guns and 40mm AA had completely disabled a heavy cruiser and reeked havoc with the superstructures of the Yamato, the Chokai, and the Tone...from 2000yds...point blank range for naval gunnery. Incredible story.
Templar, re Grant, I'll give you that. I've always had a broader definition of tactics than most people have 9i constantly fight with my wife about this). In light of how warfare has developed during my lifetime (culminating in cyber-war), I've tended to argue that the concept of dividing things based on whether one is in "tactile" contact with the enemy is increasingly irrelevant. Probably because of my legal background, I've tended (and again I admit and recognize I'm being unconventional about this) to divide things along the lines of substance and procedure. Strategy is what one wants to achieve, i.e., objective; tactics is how one goes about trying to achieve it. it does retain a touch of the accepted definitions in the sense that strategy is what you want from the enemy and tactics is how you deal with him. So my odd use of terms is probably the source of our most recent disagreements.
Just as McClellan fancied himself another Napoleon, I sort of fancy myself a Julian S. Corbett. A lawyer who never went to sea, Corbett developed an amazing grasp of naval warfare, and his book is way better than Mahan's (or given how 20th century warfare played out, it remains more relevant). But just as McClellan was no Napoleon . . . :-)
Templar, based on your comment here about what Fr. McD said to Millies, I went back and re-read. How did I miss that? Absolutely priceless.
I tried to go back and read portions of the discussion between Anon2, Millies, and Gene - I can't really understand it between all the double-speak and backslapping...
At any rate, Millies is a fine example of the danger of the historical-critical method.
Napolean had no real opponent until Wellington and then he lost. France fighting England and knowing full well, I think, that much of the war would be determined on the sea, was stupid. A coalition of French and (at times) Spanish, and Dutch navies could not handle England, even with all the resources of the European continent. FAIL...
It is tough to argue that Wellington is Boney's equal when they fought only once, and then when Boney was sick, and Le Grand Armee not so Grand.
On the Strategic level, if Napoleon had a moment of clarity and managed to suppress his ego and not invade Russia in 1812, we could well sit be sitting around looking at a Europe still dominated by the French, and the English locked out of European markets, and Europe suffering very little for it. Russia undermining the French by trading with England posed very little threat to France, hardly enough to justify the invasion, but when you're a legend I guess you have to set common sense aside and take matters in hand.
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